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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
PATRICIA BUCZYNSKI, 
Petitioner/ Appellant, 
v. 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH, 
THE WORKERS' COMPENSATION FUND 
OF UTAH, and UTAH STATE 
UNIVERSITY, 
Respondents/ Appellee. 
Case No. 940544 
Priority Number 15 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This is an appeal from a decision by the Industrial Commission of Utah. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
The issue to be determined is whether appellant was in course and scope 
of her employment at the time of her injury. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The standard of review is correctness. Walls v. Industrial Commission, 
857 P. 2d 964,966-8 (Utah App. 1993). 
ADDITIONAL FACTS 
1. Applicant, and her companion, Diane Valencia, lived in 
McGaheysville, Virginia from July 1988, to January 1991. Applicant was 
employed during this time at James Madison University, (hereinafter JMU). 
They moved from there when Ms. Buczynski accepted employment with Utah 
State University (hereinafter USU). (Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and 
Order hereinafter Order, at pages 2, 7).1 
2. Prior to leaving on the trip to McGaheysville, applicant was in 
"constant conflict with... the people ... she worked with ... and was obsessive 
about it" (T. at p. 168) 
3. Applicant was scheduled to participate in a "poster presentation" at a 
conference in Baltimore, Maryland beginning March 27,1992. A poster 
presentation is where a large number of people gather in a conference room and 
make themselves available to answer questions on a paper they have written. 
4. The paper applicant was to present at the conference had been 
accepted and approved by the conference sponsor in January of 1991. (R. at p. 
167) 
5. While it is common to do last minute preparations for a poster 
presentation, most of the work is done well in advance. (T. at pages 336, 353) 
1
 The Order is found in the record at pages 89-105. References herein are to the page ntimbers of 
the Order itself and not the record. 
2 
6. Applicant and Ms. Valencia flew to Washington, DC on March 24,1992 
where they rented a car and drove 100 miles South to McGaheysville. They 
remained there until March 27th when they drove to Baltimore. (Order at p. 2) 
7. Applicant testified that airfare considerations were part of the reason 
for the trip to McGaheysville, but that the main reason for her diversion "was to 
prepare" for the presentation at the conference. (T. at p. 51) The record is 
devoid of any other evidence substantiating applicant's claim that she received a 
lower fare by leaving on Tuesday the 24th, as opposed to Thursday the 26th or 
Friday, the 27th. 
8. All of the materials applicant needed to read in preparation for her 
presentation were available to her either at the USU library or through its 
interlibrary loan program. It takes between a few hours and "two to three days" 
to receive materials through the interlibrary loan program. (T. pages 348-352) 
9. Applicant's supervisor, Professor Bertoch, testified that it is the policy 
of USU to encourage employees to save money by obtaining lower airfares. (T. 
at p. 335) He was unaware that she was leaving early either for airfare 
considerations or her claim that she wanted to do research at JMU. He testified 
that he would not have approved the early departure for either of these reasons. 
(T. at p. 323) He approved the early departure because he believed applicant 
was going to remain in Washington, DC to seek information about federal grant 
money that might be available to USU. (T. at pages 326-327, 338-339) 
11. Applicant did not seek reimbursement for expenses incurred during 
her stay in McGaheysville. (R. at pages 157-159) 
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12. Applicant's position at USU allowed her to perform many of her work 
activities away from campus. In addition to the classes she taught, applicant 
was required to be available for some regular office hours. The rest of the time 
she could work wherever she wished. She maintained an office in her home and 
commonly worked there. (T. at pages 164-166) 
13. After going out to dinner Thursday evening with Ms. Valencia, they 
returned to the hotel and went downstairs to use the hotel hot tub. The injury 
occurred as she was exiting the hot tub. She was performing no work related 
activities at the time. (T. at pages 203-205) 
14. Three of applicant's neighbors testified that applicant "is not a 
trustworthy individual and that she has a reputation in her immediate 
community of being dishonest in her dealings with others/' (Order at p. 15) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Applicants entire three day trip to McGaheysville was a distinct 
departure from her authorized business trip. Because of her occupation as a 
college professor she was allowed elasticity in where and when she performed 
many of her job assignments. By electing to take some work with her to 
McGaheysville she can not turn a personal trip into part of the business trip since 
the work done was merely incidental to her true purpose. Even if the entire trip 
to McGaheysville is not seen as a distinct departure, her activities at the time of 
the accident, exiting from the hotel hot tub, were. 
Before and after the accident, applicant engaged in a pattern of deception. 
She omitted to tell her employer of her plans to go to McGaheysville and did not 
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seek reimbursement for her expenses while there, she was described by her 
neighbors as being untrustworthy and dishonest, she displayed behavior 
consistent with symptom magnification and she described an "injury" that 
occurred on December 21,1992 that was entirely unbelievable. The 
Administrative Law Judge heard 14 hours of testimony, reviewed hundreds of 
pages of medical records and documents and was in the best position to judge 
the applicant's credibility. He found that her testimony and actions were self 
serving and contrary to the weight of the evidence. 
Ms. Buczynski was not acting in the scope of her employment as to the 
March 26,1992 accident and that the December 21,1992 "accident" did not occur 
at all. The Order of the Industrial Commission should be upheld. 
ARGUMENT 
I. APPLLICANT'S ACCIDENT DID NOT 
ARISE OUT OF NOR WAS IT IN THE 
COURSE OF HER EMPLOYMENT 
In order for a worker's compensation accident to be compensable, it must 
arise out of and occur in the course of employment (Utah Code Annotated 35-1-
45,1988.) The two separate clauses in this phrase; "arising out of" and "in the 
course o f employment were made conjunctive under the 1988 amendments to 
the Workers Compensation Act Therefore, a claimant must meet both 
requirements. Prior to that, the provisions were disjunctive and the claimant 
was required to meet only one or the other. 
[T]he requirement that the accident arise in the course of the 
employment is satisfied if it occurs while the employee is 
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rendering service to his employer which he was hired to do or 
doing something incidental thereto, at the time when and the place 
where he was authorized to render such service. M & K Corp. v. 
Industrial Commission 189 P2d 132 (Utah 1948). 
The reason for requiring that an employee to be rendering service at an 
authorized time and place was articulated by the Utah Supreme Court in a case 
involving the "going and coming rule." 
it is unfair to impose unlimited liability on an employer 
for conduct of its employees over which it has no control and 
from which it derives no benefit Therefore, the major focus in 
determining whether or not the general rules should apply in a 
given case is on the benefit the employer receives and his control 
over the conduct Whitehead v. Variable Annuity Life Insurance 
Company, 801 P2d 934 (1989), at p. 937. [emphasis supplied] 
In this case, applicant was injured while she was exiting from a hot tub 
while on a personal vacation to McGaheysville, Virginia. She was not in the 
process of performing any service to her employer, nor was she in a place where 
she "was authorized to render such service/' She was injured in an accident 
which did not arise out of her employment, or in the course of her employment 
Her employer received no benefit from her trip to McGaheysville, was unaware 
of her intention to travel to there, and exercised no control over her conduct 
while there. 
A. APPLICANT'S TRIP TO McGAHEYSVILLE 
WAS A DISTINCT DEPARTURE 
FROM HER AUTHORIZED BUSINESS TRIP 
An exception to the course of employment portion of the rule has been 
carved out in the case of the traveling employee. 
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Employees whose work entails travel away from the 
employer's premises are held in the majority of jurisdictions to be 
within the course of their employment continuously during the 
trip, except when a distinct departure] on a personal errand is 
shown. Thus, injuries arising out of the necessity of sleeping in 
hotels or eating in restaurants away from home are usually held 
compensable. 1A A. Larson, Workmen's Compensation Law 
Section 25.00 (1985) [emphasis supplied] 
This is known as the "continuous coverage rule." Since the employee is 
required to be away from home, certain necessary activities which would 
otherwise be outside the scope of employment, are covered. Coverage is limited 
to situations where the employee was engaged in "activities reasonably required 
for personal health and comfort" Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Orgon, 721 
S.W.2d 572 (Texas App. 1986). The classic example of a necessary activity is the 
employee who dies in a hotel fire while sleeping in his room. Although the 
death did not arise from or in the course of employment, courts reason that 
since sleeping in the hotel is necessary to the business function, the accident 
occurred at a "time when and the place where [the employee] was authorized 
to" be. By requiring the overnight stay, the employer is exercising control over 
the employee and thereby exposing him to risk to which he would not 
otherwise have been exposed. The employer is also receiving a "benefit7' from 
the employee's presence at the hotel as the overnight stay is necessary for 
business. (See Larson, § 25.00) Under the same theory, coverage has been 
extended to include injuries which occur when an employee is eating in a 
restaurant or traveling to or from the restaurant, is in the performance of his 
daily ablutions, as in Orgon, supra and in some cases, while exercising, see Gray 
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v. Eastern Airlines, Inc. 475 So.2d 1288 (Florida (1985). However, the continuous 
coverage rule has never been extended to include injuries that occur when a 
"distinct [departure] on a personal errand is shown/' Larson, supra. 
Taking advantage of a business trip by "tacking" a three day vacation 
onto either end of the trip will not provide coverage for injuries which occur 
during the vacation portion of the trip. In Yorkin, v. Volvo Distributing Co., 363 
A2d 908 (New Jersey, 1976), the facts were very similar to the facts here: 
The employee had been attending a convention in Miami 
Beach, Florida., He did not return to his home or place of 
employment in N. J. following the termination of the convention on 
Thursday. Instead, by special and extraordinary permission 
granted at his request, he was permitted to remain in Florida, 
staying with relatives and at his own expense until Sunday. On 
Saturday, as he was standing in the ocean surf, he was struck in the 
head by a belligerent pelican and the injury ensued.... 
The court held the injury was not work related. 
We are satisfied that a three day personal vacation tacked 
onto the end of the convention removes an injury occurring during 
that period from the course of employment Id. at p. 908 
Ms. Buczynski's three day trip to McGaheysville was a vacation tacked 
onto the beginning of a business trip and any injury she sustained is not 
compensable. 
APPLICANT'S ACTIONS SHOW THAT 
SHE HERSELF DID NOT CONSIDER THE TRIP 
TO McGAHEYSVILLE TO BE WORK RELATED. 
The travel voucher applicant submitted for advance approval for her trip 
indicated that the purpose for the trip was the delivery of a paper in Baltimore, 
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"flying into Washington, DC" (R p. 160) The voucher was prepared by 
applicant, typed by Karen Ranson, the department secretary, and approved by 
Professor Bertoch. Although applicant indicated she was "flying into 
Washington, DC," she failed to tell either of them that her intended destination 
was McGaheysville, Virginia. 
Upon her return, applicant submitted receipts for expenses for which she 
was seeking reimbursement Among them were ten receipts for meals and two 
for snacks. Of the twelve receipts, ten bear dates between March 27th and March 
30th the dates of the actual conference. (R p. 159) The other two have no date. (R 
p. 158) Applicant only sought reimbursement for meals on dates of the actual 
conference in Baltimore. She also submitted a request for reimbursement for her 
lodging in Baltimore while at the conference. (R p. 157) But she submitted no 
request for reimbursement for her lodging while in McGaheysville. Applicant 
did request reimbursement for mileage but that was for travel between Logan 
and the Salt Lake International Airport and not for the trip to McGaheysville. (R 
p. 160) 
If the intention of her trip to McGaheysville was purely, or even 
primarily, business in nature, she should have informed her employer in 
advance and she would have sought reimbursement for expenses while there. 
Since applicant has made no attempt to explain these suspicious omissions, the 
Administrative Law Judge (hereinafter ALJ) was entirely justified in weighing 
this in light of the rest of the evidence and concluding that applicant was on a 
personal diversion from the business trip. 
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THE EMPLOYER DID NOT AUTHORIZE, 
DIRECT OR REQUIRE APPLICANT 
TO BE IN McGAHEYSVILLE 
Applicant asserts in her brief that her extended stay at McGaheysville 
"took place not only with the knowledge but the active encouragement of 
applicant's employer.../' (Applicant's brief p. 9) This allegation is not 
supported by the record. It was clearly established that her employer had no 
knowledge of her intentions to travel to McGaheysville. Applicant's travel 
voucher showed that her destination was Washington, DC, some 50 miles from 
the convention site in Baltimore. Her employer assumed, perhaps because he 
was actively misled by Ms. Buczynski, that Washington, DC was her destination 
for the first three days of her trip and that she would be staying there until the 
conference to investigate the possibilities of obtaining federal grant money for 
USU. 
Her employer did nothing to "actively encourage" her to go to 
McGaheysville. Professor Bertoch testified that it is the policy of USU to 
encourage its employees to obtain the least expensive air fare possible. There 
was no evidence that he knew this was Ms. Buczynski's alleged reason for going 
to McGaheysville. Because the university policy is one of frugality does not 
mean that an employee can tack a three day personal vacation onto a business 
trip and expect all injuries sustained to be compensable. 
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APPLICANT'S ACTIVITIES IN ACCOMODATING 
WORK AWAY FROM THE CAMPUS OF 
HER EMPLOYER SERVED A PERSONAL 
AS OPPOSED TO BUSINESS PURPOSE. 
Applicant attempted to create a business purpose for the excursion to 
McGaheysville by taking work with her. According to the testimony of Diane 
Valencia, applicant did the same type of work those three days in 
McGaheysville as she routinely did when at home. In addition, the two of them 
engaged in many "vacation" type activities; they visited old friends in the area, 
went shopping, visited a winery, and spent their evenings eating out and 
returning to the hotel to sit in the hot tub. The only thing that made the trip to 
McGaheysville different from applicant's usual work routine was her alleged use 
of the JMU library. Her alleged use of this library became a point of dispute at 
the hearing when applicant said she "basically" went to McGaheysville to do 
research for her upcoming presentation. 
Ms. Buczynski testified that she did use the library at JMU for research 
purposes and maintains that Ms. Valencia's testimony supports that claim. That 
is a mischaracterization of Ms. Valencia's testimony. Ms. Valencia testified that 
on two occasions she drove applicant to JMU where she dropped her off and 
picked her up later. When asked at the hearing if she knew "if Pat was doing 
research ... in Virginia," Ms. Valencia stated "I wasn't with her, so I couldn't 
answer that" The ALJ found that "[a] host of other activities could be imagined 
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which would plausibly explain applicant's visits to JMU, such as visiting friends 
and acquaintances on the JMU faculty/' (Order at p. 8) 
It was unnecessary for applicant to travel to McGaheysville to do 
research. Applicant presented no evidence that research materials were 
available at JMU that were not available at USU. Applicant's supervisor, 
Professor Bertoch testified that many resources applicant might have been 
looking for were in fact available at USU and that all resources were available 
through the interlibrary loan program at USU. (T. at pages 348-352) 
Applicant's paper was accepted for presentation in January of 1991. The 
conference was the end of March. The trip to Baltimore and McGaheysville was 
planned months in advance. Ms. Buczynski testified that she knew all the 
materials she needed to prepare for her presentation were available through the 
interlibrary loan program. She went to McGaheysville to read these materials 
because "when you're going out of state [the interlibrary loan program] takes 
quite a bit of time to get these resources...." (T. at p. 52) The unrebutted 
testimony of Professor Bertoch was that an interlibrary loan request takes 
between a few hours and a few days to be filled. Ms. Buczynski seems to argue 
that inasmuch as she was unwilling to request the materials a few days in 
advance, her employer should have sanctioned the trip to JMU. 
The ALJ found that the trip to McGaheysville was for personal, not 
business purposes. Applicant argues in her brief "it was error for the ALJ to 
characterize the applicant's stay [there] as a personal vacation" because she did 
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research in McGaheysville. The ALJ cited eight separate reasons for his finding. 
Only the last reason challenged applicant's assertion that she was engaged in 
research. 
Other reasons for the ALJ's finding are set forth on pages 7-8 of the Order. 
They include: applicant and her companion had previously lived in the area and 
engaged in "personal" activities such as visiting friends and sightseeing; the 
excursion had been planned months in advance; applicant's conduct before and 
after the trip demonstrate her own belief that she was not on university business 
at the time; and since applicant's testimony was found to be self serving and 
lacking in credibility, her unsubstantiated assertions about the trip had to be 
discounted or ignored. 
The most compelling reason, according to the ALJ, was that a college 
professor, while required to do scholarly research, receives great personal 
benefit from the publication of their work. Applicant, for personal convenience, 
often performed this research away from the university campus. By taking work 
with her to McGaheysville, applicant could not turn a three day diversion from 
the conference site into an extension of the business trip. That reason alone, 
according to the ALJ, would warrant a finding that the trip to McGaheysville 
was "personal in its motivation and purpose from start to finish, and that the 
work activities engaged in during this diversion were merely 'incidental and 
adjunctive' thereto." (Order at p. 6) 
Professor Larson notes that employees who, for reasons of personal 
convenience, take work away from the employer's premises, are not acting at the 
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request or direction of their employers and are thus engaged in personal 
activities while away from the office. (See Larson's Workers Compensation Desk 
Edition sections 18.33 and 18.34). The California Supreme Court phrased it 
succinctly in Wilson v. Workers Comp. App. Bd., 545 P.2d 225 (CA1976) at p. 
227 holding that "serving the employee's own convenience in selecting an off-
premise place to work is a personal and not a business purpose." 
That was the holding in Rowan v. University of Nebraska, 299 N.W.2d 
774 (Nebraska 1980). Rowan was an art professor at the University. One of his 
job assignments was to continue to produce art while teaching. A requirement 
not unlike publishing and/or presenting papers in other disciplines. Rowan had 
for a time sculpted in his office at the University but later moved to a studio 
located in a building adjacent to his home. One day while he was working in his 
studio, he climbed a ladder to open a window. The window was stuck, and as 
he pulled harder to open it, he lost his balance and fell from the ladder. In 
denying compensation, the Nebraska Supreme Court noted that the employer 
was not "required to assume the risk incidental to a defective window" in the 
professor's private home studio simply because the employee elected to do work 
at home for reasons of personal convenience. In so holding, the Nebraska court 
stated: 
The plaintiff was in a situation similar to that of an 
employee who was required to satisfy certain requirements as part 
of the employment but was at liberty to choose the time and place 
where he would accomplish the work. In such a situation, the 
activity performed by the employee is generally considered to be 
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of but an incidental benefit to the employer and not covered by 
the compensation act Id. at p. 775 [emphasis supplied] 
The same reasoning applies to the instant case even though Rowan was 
working in his home and not out of town. When an employee is at liberty to 
take his work away from the office for personal convenience, the employee is not 
covered continuously while at the site where s/he chose to perform the work. 
An exception to this has been recognized when the employee is actually 
performing work related duties at the time of the accident and the injury is 
caused by an agent associated with the job, such as a police officer injured while 
cleaning his gun at home. Applicant here was not working while in the hot tub 
nor was using the hot tub associated with her employment 
The facts here are strikingly similar to the facts in Virginia Polytechnic 
Institute v. Wood, 369 S. E.2d 376 (Va.App. 1987). There, Wood was scheduled 
to present a paper at a professional conference. She was a avid bicyclist and flew 
to the site of the conference one day early with the intention of bicycling to a 
campsite 42 miles from the airport "Once at the campsite, she planned to make 
final preparation in solitude for her presentation/' Id at p. 377 She was injured 
while riding her bike to the campsite. 
Her supervisor testified that she "had considerable latitude in making all 
decisions associated with her work and research ... and although her travel plan 
had not been approved in advance, he would have done so had he had the 
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opportunity to consider it" Id. at p. 378. The Court accepted the Commission's 
finding that the excursion to the camp site was work related noting that, 
[t]he Commission based its finding, in part, upon the fact 
that Wood's alternate travel and lodging arrangements would save 
[the employer] money, a finding which we find difficult to accept 
in view of the additional travel days and expenses involved. 
Nevertheless, for our purposes we accept the Commission's finding 
that her sole purpose in going to the campsite was work related. 
Id. at p. 379 
Even finding that the excursion to the campsite was work related, the 
Virginia Court found that the Commission had erred in allowing coverage. 
We need not consider or decide whether Wood would have 
been in the course of her employment after she arrived at the 
campsite and while preparing her presentation.... 
The present case is a situation where an employee with 
broad discretion in how and when and, to some extent, where he 
work is to be performed chooses to do a work related task at a 
location remote from her customary and usual place of 
employment That Wood chose a campsite near Las Vegas to make 
her preparation is immaterial. Had she chosen a campground 
near [her home] or a solitary retreat at any location, whether 
authorized or not, or had she been on her way to her office ... the 
same result would obtain. Id at p. 380 
In finding that the accident did not arise out of or in the course of her 
employment, the court held that the continuous coverage rule has no application 
to employees who are free to do their work where and when they wish. Even if 
the trip would have been approved in advance, as the employer in Wood 
testified. 
Applicant cites Martinson v. W-M Insurance Agency, Inc., 606 P.2d 256 
(Utah 1980) in support of her position that her excursion to McGaheysville was 
work related. This is a very interesting and tortured reading of that case. 
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Martinson was the vice president of the defendant insurance company who 
spent a significant part of his time contacting customers. The director of the 
Kimball Art Center in Park City, Robert Williams, was a personal friend of 
Martinson's and the Center had purchased a policy from him. Williams invited 
Martinson to attend the opening of the Art Center and to consult with him 
regarding the adequacy of their insurance policy. Martinson drove to Park City, 
spent the evening "socializing" with Williams and his wife and spent the night 
in their condominium. 
Before he left the next day, Martinson and Williams agreed to increase the 
insurance which Martinson confirmed by a telephone call to the insurance 
company. The Supreme Court found it "noteworthy ... that the amount of 
additional coverage was based on inventory records of the art center, which had 
previously been sent to [Martinson's] Salt Lake office, and that the business 
about it did not require any personal inspection of the exhibits by [Martinson]." 
Id. at p. 257. 
That afternoon Martinson was injured in an automobile accident on his 
way home to Salt Lake City. Martinson claimed that he was in the performance 
of his employment duties when injured and was entitled to benefits. The 
Industrial Commission and the Supreme Court disagreed. The Court reasoned: 
To maintain actuarial soundness and integrity of workmen's 
compensation systems, it is essential that premiums be collected to 
cover the risks involved. The coverage does not, and as a practical 
matter, cannot extend to any injury done to an employee 
wherever and whenever it happens, but is limited to accidental 
injuries which occur in the course of or arise out of the 
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performance of his duties. A special problem exists in some 
occupations such as salesmen, where there is elasticity both as to 
the place and hours of such performance; and wherein it is 
comparatively easy for an employee, who may suffer an injury at 
practically any time or place, to contrive a report of being involved 
in business in order to bring himself under coverage. At pages 257-
258 [emphasis supplied] 
The Court went on to note that in some occupations social pleasures or 
diversions can be combined with the performance of work and that alone should 
not preclude coverage. 
In such situations, where problems arise as to coverage, one 
of the tests sometimes applied is whether such a trip is one which 
someone else would have had to make for the employer at some 
time if the claimant had not Another ... test... is whether the 
paramount or predominant motivation and purpose of the trip or 
other activity is to serve the employer's interest, and the social 
aspects, or other diversion for one's own interest, is merely 
adjunctive thereto.... 
[If] the predominant motivation... is ... social... or 
personal... even though there may be some transaction of 
business or performance of duty merely incidental or adjunctive 
thereto, the person should not be deemed to be in the course of 
his employment; and where there is uncertainty ... that should be 
resolved by the Commission, as the trier of the facts. At p. 258 
[emphasis supplied] 
In upholding the Commission, the Court was persuaded by the fact that 
the insurance could have been increased without anyone having left the Salt 
Lake office. 
Applicant argues that Martinson supports her position that the entire trip, 
to Baltimore and McGaheysville should be covered because her paramount 
motivation was the delivery of the poster presentation. This ignores the fact that 
the accident occurred on a three day diversion from the business trip. This 
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diversion does not fall within the two tests described in Martinson. The work 
applicant did while on the diversion to McGaheysville could have been done on 
the USU campus and her paramount or predominant motivation was social, not 
serving her employer's interests. It appears that Ms. Buczynski did just what the 
Supreme Court feared, she contrived "a report of being involved in business in 
order to bring [herself] under coverage." 
Applicant also cites Ogden Standard Examiner v. Industrial Commission 
of Utah, 663 P.2d 88 (Utah 1983). There the deceased was driving home from the 
Governor's Ball at the time of the accident He attended the ball at the invitation 
of his boss with the expectation that they would discuss work. Although no 
business was in fact discussed, the Supreme Court found that since the 
deceased's "paramount or predominant motivation and purpose in making the 
trip was to serve the interest o f his employer, and he was "entirely justified in 
inferring a business purpose from the invitation/' the Industrial Commission's 
finding of coverage was upheld. At p. 89 
The facts in Ogden are distinguishable from the facts here. The accident 
did not occur during a diversion from the trip, the decedent was invited to 
attend the function by and with his boss, and this was not a situation where 
decedent took work away from his employer's premises for reasons of personal 
convenience. As the ALJ pointed out 
[t]o determine coverage in fOgden and Martinson] it was 
necessary to decide if the activity for which the travel was required 
was predominantly business or pleasure. In the case at hand, the 
accident occurred during a personal diversion a substantial 
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distance away from the business destination after the applicant had 
arrived at the destination occasioned by the business travel. The 
accident did not occur during the travel to or from that destination. 
Order at p. 8 
He went on to state that had Ms. Buczynski been injured while traveling 
between her home in Logan and Washington, DC, it would have been 
reasonable to have found her to be in the course of her employment 
To make the facts in Ogden similar to the facts here, hypothesize that the 
decedent was injured while driving to Logan for personal reasons prior to the 
Governor's Ball. Intending to proceed directly to Salt Lake afterwards would 
not have brought him within the coverage of workers compensation. 
The rule denying coverage to employees who are allowed to perform 
work away from the office for personal convenience is in keeping with the basic 
principles of compensation law. To rule otherwise would work an injustice on 
employers by making them liable for injuries that are not caused by the 
employment. As the Supreme Court in Martinson feared employees could 
ensure coverage for themselves during any vacation or personal activity simply 
by electing to take some work with them. One of the byproducts of workers 
compensation law has been to encourage employers to provide safe work 
environments which result in fewer injuries and lower insurance premiums. If 
an employee is covered while away from the office by taking work with him, the 
employer would lose all control over the risk to which the employee is exposed. 
The end result would likely be that employers would not allow off site work. 
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For many types of employment this would create an inconvenience for both the 
employee and the employer. 
EVEN IF IT IS FOUND THAT THE ENTIRE TRIP TO 
McGAHEYSVILLE WAS NOT A DIVERSION, THE 
APPLICANT'S ACTIVITIES AT THE TIME OF 
THE ACCIDENT WERE NOT WORK RELATED 
While Defendants believe the entire time spent in McGaheysville was a 
diversion, it could also be said that the activities engaged in at the time of the 
accident constituted a diversion as well. On the evening of the accident, 
applicant and Ms. Valencia had gone out to dinner. When they returned, they 
went to the hot tub in a public area of the hotel. Applicant was not performing 
work at the time. She got out of the hot tub to get dressed, slipped on some 
water, and fell. These activities were clearly for her "own pleasure and 
gratification,... [not] beneficial or incidental to [her] employment and [hence] 
constitute a stepping aside from the employment" Alexander Film Co. v. 
Industrial Commission, 319 P2d 1074 (Colorado, 1957) at p. 1076. 
While it is true that an employee who is away from home on a business 
trip for her employer is in most circumstances under continuous workers 
compensation coverage from the time he leaves until he returns home, there are 
exceptions to this general rule. As was noted in Alexander: 
Such an employee is in continuous employment, day and 
night This does not mean that he can not step aside from his 
employment for personal reasons, or reasons in no way connected 
with his employment, just as might an ordinary employee working 
on a schedule of hours at a fixed location. He might rob a bank; he 
21 
might attend a dance; or he might engage in other activities equally 
conceivable for his own pleasure and gratification, and ordinarily 
none of these acts would be beneficial or incidental to his 
employment and would constitute a stepping aside from the 
employment 
Such a stepping aside from employment was found in Silver Engineering 
Works, Inc. v Simmons, 505 P2d 966 (Colorado). There, the decedent was in 
Mexico on behalf of his employer. "Several days after arriving at El Dorado, 
Mexico, and during the period when the plant was shut down for the Easter 
weekend, the decedent, and several other employees, drove ... to a remote beach 
to swim and fish. The decedent went swimming ... and met his death by 
drowning/ ' At p 967. In finding that the decedent was not entitled to workers 
compensation benefits, the Colorado Supreme Court discussed the continuous 
coverage rule and the personal errand exception concluding that "the traveling 
employee is as capable of departing on a personal errand as any other type of 
employee, thereby losing the right to compensation benefits from accidents 
occurring during such departures." At p 968. [emphasis supplied] The Court 
held that "the decedent had indeed stepped aside from his employment and was 
attending to a matter of personal recreation, which was beyond that necessary to 
the normal ministration to needs of an employee on a business trip." Id at p. 968. 
The Court of Appeals of Ohio reached the same conclusion in Marbury v 
Industrial Commission of Ohio, 577 NE2d 672 (Ohio, 1989). In that case, 
Marbury was attending a conference in Baltimore, Maryland. The conference 
met from 9:00 AM through 5:00 PM for six consecutive days. At 5:00 p m on one 
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of the conference days, a bus tour of Washington, DC was made available to 
conference participants. The cost of the tour was not included in the registration 
fee. Marbury and her supervisor went on the tour. The parties disagreed about 
whether or not business was discussed on the bus or if the supervisor 
encouraged Marbuy to take the tour. Additionally, Marbury was reimbursed for 
the tour but had characterized it as a "dinner meeting" as a brown bag meal was 
served on the bus. Her employer testified that the tour would not have been 
reimbursed had Marbury not misrepresented the expense. 
At between 9:30 PM and 10:00 PM the bus made its last stop at a souvenir 
shop. Marbury testified that she went into the souvenir shop to purchase a T-
shirt for her daughter. The accident occurred when she was entered the shop. 
In holding that the accident was not compensable, the Court noted that "[t]here 
is no apparent benefit that [the employer] could have expected to receive from 
Marbury7 s presence in the souvenir shop for the declared purpose of purchasing 
a T-shirt for her daughter/' (Id at p. 673) and held that "reasonable minds can 
only come to the conclusion that when she left the bus and entered a souvenir 
shop in Washington for the purpose of purchasing a T-shirt for her daughter, she 
was on a purely personal mission of her own, having nothing to do with her 
employer's purposes and was therefore outside the course of her employment." 
(Id. at p. 674) 
The case of Perry v American Bakeries Co., 136 S.E.2d 643 (North 
Carolina 1964) is more directly on point There, the employee was attending a 
sales meeting in a hotel away from home. All the hotel expenses were paid for 
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by the employer. On the night of the accident, all employees in attendance were 
invited to a social hour after which the claimant and another employee went to 
dinner. After dinner, claimant sustained a diving injury while swimming in the 
hotel's swimming pool. The Court held that swimming was not sufficiently 
connected to the sales meeting and benefits were denied. 
Applicant's use of the hot tub at the time of the accident is not unlike 
Perry's use of the swimming pool. It should also be noted that the court in Perry 
emphasized the fact that the employer was paying for lodgings at the hotel. 
Here, USU did not Applicant paid for her own hotel room and all of her 
expenses while in McGaheysville. 
A like result was found in Brownlee, v. Wetterau Food Services, et al., 339 
S.E.2d 694 (South Carolina, 1986). There the employee, Brownlee, was attending 
an out of state training seminar. The seminar was held between 7:00 a.m. and 
10:00 p.m. Brownlee and three other employees died in an automobile accident 
at 1:55 a.m. after having attended a movie. In holding the accident was not job 
related, the Court said: 
Absent... is evidence that Brownlee died while attending 
either a job related function or employer-sponsored event. Rather 
... Brownlee died while engaged in an outing that occurred after 
work, away from the premises of his employer, and at a time when 
his employer exercised no control over his activities. Id at p. 695 
In all four of these cases, the courts found that the employee was on a 
diversion from work or personal comfort activities taking them out of the 
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continuous coverage rule. Likewise, applicant's use of the hot tub was a clear 
diversion. 
The cases cited by applicant in her brief are disi i njjuishal'>le> from lit*1 I acts 
here. In Orgon, the claimant was performing his morning ablutions when he 
wa n Iot 1 «i iJ r 1111*., of water He reached for the glass which dropped from his 
hand. When he tried to catch it, it shattered in his hand. The Texas court noted 
that 
[t]he merit of the continuous coverage principle is especially 
apparent from the facts in this case. But for the business-related 
necessity of sleeping overnight in an out-of-town hotel room, 
Orgon would have awakened on the day in question in the comfort 
and security of familiar surroundings; he would have been 
unhurried; and he would have used a paper cup to get his usual 
drink of water. Id. at p. 575 
Orgon was engaged in an activity that would have of necessity been 
p e r l oi" ine< 1  *i I f i< > i m j , B<1111 jt* i n strange surroundings as a result of his 
employment, added a hazard to a necessary function. There is no necessity in 
being in the hot tub. 
In Gray v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 475 So.2d 1288 (Florida (1985) the 
claimant was a flight attendant staying at a hotel on a scheduled two day 
layover I le hi >k<» his nose while playing basketball at the YMCA. His 
employer paid for his hotel accommodations and guests of the hotel were 
entitled to use the YMCA facilities. Gray "testified that he was playing 
basketball to prepare loi an (employer] sponsored basketball tournament... 
[and]... that he also tried to exercise during all lay-overs, saying that Eastern 
requires flight attendants to stay in good physical condition." In allowing 
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benefits, the Florida court held that participating in a sports activity under the 
facts in that case, constituted an activity "reasonably required for personal health 
and comfort" Id. at p. 1289 
Applicant here was not performing any function necessary to daily living 
such as obtaining exercise or getting a drink of water. She was relaxing in a hot 
tub which can no be said to be "required" for personal health. This was 
correctly construed by the ALJ and the Industrial Commission as a distinct 
departure on a personal errand not unlike buying souvenirs, swimming at the 
beach or in the hotel swimming pool, or going to a movie. 
THE INCONTROVERTED EVIDENCE PROVED THAT 
APPLICANT'S TESTIMONY WAS INCONSISTENT, 
UNBELIEVABLE AND SELF SERVING 
Applicant's first accident was on March 26,1992. She prepared and filed 
an Employee's First Report of Injury Form on April 8,1992. (R. at p. 3) and saw 
numerous doctors over the course of the next two and one half months. It was 
not until her visit to Dr. Reichert on June 6,1992 that she first mentioned that she 
had also suffered an injury to her head and neck. (Order at p. 7) 
Over the course of the next year and one half, applicant displayed 
behavior consistent with symptom magnification. She portrayed herself to her 
treating physicians as "a woman having great difficulty communicating with 
others and performing the basic functions required of a university professor/' 
(Order at p. 11) Although she wore a knee brace and, immediately prior to the 
hearing in October of 1993, a neck brace, her day to day activities were 
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inconsistent with a person suffering from the physical and mental limitations she 
claimed were the result of the injury. (Order pages 12-13) 
Three of her neighbors testified that she had a reputation in the 
community of being untrustworthy and dishonest This evidence went 
unrebutted* These Siimc vviltiesses, »iiid Ms. Valencia, tostifioiI Ihat applicanl 
suffered an unrelated fall in February of 1993 which needed medical attention 
but applicant refused stating that she was afraid it would hurt her chances of 
winning this lawsuit against USU. (T. at pages 193-196) 
Applicant was in "constant conflict with ... the people ... that she worked 
with" and was "obsessive about it" immediately prior to the March 26,1992 
incident (T. at p. 188) This may have provided the motivation for the 
allegations made by applicant against her employer. 
Applicai it also claimed that si: le "\ \ as fi irther injured in a separate 
industrial injury on December 21,1992. Although this alleged accident is not 
mentioned in her brief, it was referenced on the docketing statement and 
deserves mention here. Applicant claimed, that on that da\ she w as standing it i 
the doorway of Karen Ranson's office when Professor Bertoch violently jerked 
the door" open \ Itl: longl t on a utches at the time, applicant claimed that she had 
to lean on her left knee and that she some how jerked her neck in an attempt to 
prevent herself from falling. The door against she was leaning was glass and 
easily seen through. It would have been impossible for Professor Kertoi ii no I lo 
have seen her had he opened the door. 
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Neither Professor Bertoch or Karen Ranson remember this event having 
occurred. Applicant originally wanted to file assault and battery charges against 
Professor Bertoch for what she considered was his violent opening of the door. 
She claimed that as a result of this incident she severely injured her left knee (she 
presented photographs that she claimed depicted her left knee badly bruised 
from this) and that she herniated the disks in her neck necessitating surgery. 
The Administrative Law Judge heard the testimony of all three parties who were 
present, according to applicant, when this event occurred. The Judge found that 
the testimony of Professor Bertoch and Ms. Ranson to be more credible and they 
testified that nothing had occurred in any way similar to the event described by 
applicant on that or any other day, even though applicant claimed she had been 
talking to Ms. Ranson at the time and that Professor Bertoch was the alleged 
"assailant" (Order p. 10) 
Applicant has done nothing to explain her lack of candor before or during 
the hearing. The record and the Order are replete with examples of 
inconsistencies in her behavior and testimony. Her claims that she did research 
at JMU, was injured on December 21,1992, or that she went to McGaheysville 
early to obtain cheaper airfare were and should weighed in light of applicant's 
other self serving statements and behavior and discounted or ignored. 
NO CREDIBLE EVIDENCE WAS INTRODUCTED 
TO SUPPORT APPLICANT'S CLAIM THAT 
HER EARLY DEPARTURE RESULTED 
IN A LOWER AIRFARE 
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March 24,1992 fell on a Tuesday. The convention in Baltimore was from 
March 27lh to Man h MP\ Friday through Monday. Most air lines offer a reduced 
fare if travel includes a stay on a Saturday night Since Applicant was going to 
stay over in Baltimore on Saturday, March 28th, there is no credible evidence to 
support iliiii Ibe i (inclusion that her early departure resulted in a induction in 
airfare. The only evidence tending to substantiate that Applicant saved her 
employer money by going early is her own self serving testimony which was 
found in several other particulars to be lacking in credibility. And that 
testimony is not substantiated by air line industry standards. 
V he early departure in fact saved USU money, it 
should be noted that Applicant had a personal reason for obtaining a lower 
airfare. Applicant wanted Diane Valencia to accompany her on the trip for 
purely personal reasons. Applicant was • * ig Ms. V a I e n c i a a n d w a s I h u s 
paying her fare out of her own funds. By arranging for a less expensive flight 
for herself, she saved money in paying for Ms Valencia's flight as well. 
The ALJ found that the purpose of the trip was purely personal and any 
consideration of airfare was secondary, personal or non existent. 
THE MAN DATE TO LIBERALLY CONSTRUE THE 
WORKERS COMPENSATION ACT CANNOT BE USED 
TO EXTEND BENEFITS WHERE NONE WERE INTENDED 
Applicant asserts that the rule requiring liberal construction and 
application argues in favor of extending coverage to her injury (See for 
example, Heaton v. Second Injury Fund, 796 P.2d 676). However, it is also well 
settled 11 icil the liberality rule cannot be applied in such a way as to nullify 
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provisions of the workers compensation act, or to reach a result favorable to the 
employee at the expense of a reasonable and rational interpretation of statutory 
language. (Bailey v. Lakewood Fire Protection Dist, 618 P.2d 716 (Colo. App. 
1980); Security Trust v. Smith, 596 P.2d 248 (N. M. 1979)). As stated by the 
Wyoming Supreme Court, "workers compensation statues are to be interpreted 
liberally, but courts are not free under the guise of construction to extend the 
beneficent purpose of the law to injuries that do not reasonably fall within the 
reach of the language used/' Matter of Van Matre, 657 P.2d 815 (1983). Given 
the facts of this case, it would be a strained and unreasonable construction of the 
Utah Workers Compensation Act to shift the risk of injury during an employee's 
vacation to the employer. 
CONCLUSION 
Applicant was on a distinct departure from her business trip when she 
went to McGaheysville. Taking work with her and claiming to have done 
research while there can not change this personal diversion into an extension of 
the authorized business trip to Baltimore. Her activities when injured, using the 
hot tub, did not arise out of or in the course of her employment. Her credibility 
was severely challenged by her actions both before and after the accident and 
her testimony was inconsistent, unbelievable and self serving. The Industrial 
Commission found that the weight of the evidence did not support a finding of 
compensability and should be upheld. 
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